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Abstract
Information sharing can be regarded as a form of cooperative behavior protected by the work
of a reputation system. Yet, deception in communication is common. The research examined
the possibility that speakers use epistemic markers to preempt being seen as uncooperative
even though they in fact are. Epistemic markers convey the speakers’ certainty and involve-
ment in the acquisition of the information. When speakers present a lie as indirectly acquired
or uncertain, they gain if the lie is believed and likely do not suffer if it is discovered. In our
study, speakers of English and Italian (where epistemic markers were presented lexically)
and of Estonian and Turkish (where they were presented grammatically through evidentials)
had to imagine being a speaker in a conversation and choose a response to a question. The
response options varied 1) the truth of the part of the response addressing the question at
issue and 2) whether the epistemic marker indicated that the speaker had acquired the infor-
mation directly or indirectly. Across languages, if participants chose to tell a lie, they were
likely to present it with an indirect epistemic marker, thus providing evidence for preemptive
action accompanying uncooperative behavior. For English and Italian participants, this pre-
emptive action depended respectively on resource availability and relationship with the
addressee, suggesting cultural variability in the circumstances that trigger it.
“And if, to be sure, sometimes you need to conceal a fact with words, do it in such a way that




The opportunities for information sharing afforded by the emergence of language were of piv-
otal importance in human evolution [1,2]. Information sharing was essential for cooperative
problem solving, such as food foraging, where interdependent group members needed to
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coordinate their efforts. Information sharing was also essential for the increase of group size,
because it enabled exchange of information about others, thus allowing a powerful reputation
system to develop that does not depend on direct observation. This reputation system likely
explains the ubiquity of information sharing we observe today: from situations where the costs
to speakers are minimal, e.g., providing tourists with driving directions and reviewing online
restaurants and books, to ones where information sharing appears truly altruistic as it gives
access to limited and valuable resources and entails high costs for speakers, e.g., sharing infor-
mation about a competitive grant. In all of these cases, the goal to obtain or maintain positive
reputation motivates speakers to share information and deters them from withholding infor-
mation and lying.
Theories of cooperation explain information sharing by highlighting the role of reputation
in systems based on indirect reciprocity. Individuals cooperate with the expectation that their
good behavior will be rewarded with positive reputation and cooperation not just by the recipi-
ent of their action but by others as well [3]. In a “market for cooperators” [4], or when partner
choice is available, individuals may compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists
may become ostracized [5–7]. In other words, speakers who do not share information or lie
may be avoided and have difficulty finding partners when in need. Thus, reputational concerns
can explain why speakers assume not only the relatively small costs of giving directions to a
tourist but also the larger costs inherent in situations when their interests compete with those
of addressees. Theories of impression management, developed in psychology and sociology,
similarly emphasize that human actions are partly driven by the intention to elicit positive
evaluation from partners [8–11]. In support of these positions, extensive evidence now shows
that both adults and children engage in more cooperative behavior when selfish actions are
observable and reputational concerns are higher, suggesting that individuals actively engage in
reputation protection [12–16]. The pressures of group living may have indeed led to the evolu-
tion of psychological regulatory mechanisms for tracking one’s social valuation [17].
Yet, deception is part of daily life [18–20]. Deception is a psychological process by which
one individual deliberately attempts to convince another person to accept as true what he or
she knows to be false, with the aim to gain some type of benefit or to avoid loss [21]. Lies are
frequent in daily interpersonal interactions [22], in online reviews [23], and even in controlled
laboratory experiments [24]. By some estimates, as much as 26% of interpersonal communica-
tive interactions involve deception [20]. Explanations range from population equilibria of
cooperation being robust to some incidence of uncooperative behavior [25] to low reputa-
tional costs of deception because, for example, it is difficult to detect [26,27]. Still, the inci-
dence of deception suggests that speakers fairly often prioritize their own interests over the
interests of others, and thus the possibility that reputation is not as strong a constraint on
information sharing as theorized. In this paper we suggest that this is not the case. Through
language, individuals have greater control than implied by the choice between veracity and
deception, the former with potentially high economic costs and the latter with potentially high
reputational costs. Specifically, we suggest that individuals deploy preemptive reputation pro-
tection strategies that allow them to be deceptive but avoid the reputation-damaging conse-
quences of deception.
One way in which preemptive reputation protection is possible is through the use of episte-
mic markers. Their role is based on the information they convey on the one hand, and on the
discourse status of this information on the other hand. To ground the discussion, consider the
following exchange in the context of both A and S needing childcare services and S having
found that the Blue Center is better than the Red Center. In the example, S lies. The epistemic
markers are italicized.
Preemptive reputation protection
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A: Which childcare center is better?
S: I don’t know exactly, but someone told me that the Red Center is better. You should try to
register your kids there.
Informationally, epistemic markers convey the speaker’s qualification of some other infor-
mation the speaker presents. For instance, speakers may qualify information by conveying
their certainty, e.g., “I don’t know exactly . . .”. Or they may or may not present themselves as
the source of the information (“someone told me . . .” or “I saw . . .”). In some languages, such
as Turkish and Estonian, the source of information can be presented not just through lexical
expressions but also through grammatical elements called evidentials.
At the level of discourse, a speaker’s response to a question can be divided into presenting
“at-issue” and “not-at-issue” content [28]. Information is “at-issue” if it directly addresses the
question or problem at hand. In the exchange above, A’s question defines the issue as daycare
quality. Thus, the at-issue part of the S’s response is “the Red Center is better”. The epistemic
expression “I don’t know exactly, but someone told me” is part of the response that is not at
issue. Epistemic markers can provide at-issue information, e.g., when emphasized, as in “I saw
the Red center”, and when offered in response to questions such as “How do you know?” Most
often, however, as in the exchange above, this information is provided as a backgrounded par-
enthetical comment [29,30].
Epistemic markers are relevant to reputation protection because through them speakers
can manipulate the distance between themselves and the information. Similarly to the makers
of any product offered to others, speakers bear greater responsibility for what they say if they
are its source or if they vouch for it. If they present information as originating with someone
else, they are distancing themselves from it, thus reducing their responsibility. Furthermore,
because the epistemic information is not-at-issue, it is less likely to be scrutinized (e.g., by ask-
ing: “Who exactly told you?”). Thus, manipulating the epistemic markers poses fewer risks to
the speakers’ reputations than manipulating at-issue information.
In sum, if speakers choose to lie, they can also preemptively distance themselves from the
lie in case it is discovered through the use of epistemic markers. The use of epistemic markers
thus may represent in Machiavelli’s words thinking ahead about “a ready and quick defense.”
They may protect speakers’ reputations as cooperative informants even if, later on, addressees
discover that they had lied.
The goal of the present research was to examine if speakers indeed distance themselves
from false information via manipulating its epistemic status. Research on deception shows that
expressing uncertainty, also called hedging, is associated with deceptive information in both
face-to-face and online settings [31–33]. However, to date there are few experimental investi-
gations of whether speakers indeed use epistemic markers to balance the pressures of coopera-
tion and self-interest, and whether they take into account elements like their relationship with
the addressee or the presence of competition for resources. Furthermore, as the research has
been based on English corpora, it is not clear whether the same results will be observed across
languages.
We examined whether speakers of four languages–English, Estonian, Italian, and Turkish–
were more likely to present information that they had acquired directly as uncertain and/or
indirect when falsifying it than when truthfully reporting it. We designed the studies so that in
some conditions, participants are inclined to convey the truth, and in other conditions they
are inclined to lie. Specifically, they were presented with situations where a Speaker gained
first-hand information about a resource and then another actor, the Addressee, asked about it.
(We use Speaker and Addressee to refer to the roles played in the situation.) The resource was
Preemptive reputation protection
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either limited or amply available and the Addressee was either a friend or an acquaintance of
the Speaker. Prior research shows that competition over resources and lower expectations for
reencounter decrease cooperation and increase the likelihood of lying [34]. Participants were
asked to put themselves in the shoes of the Speaker, i.e., someone who gained first-hand expe-
rience about a resource, and choose one of four possible answers to a question about that
resource. They were asked to imagine a communicative situation and behavior, and thus we
refer to them as “speakers,” but they did not actually produce spoken language.
All four alternatives participants chose among conveyed relevant information and were
appropriate in the situation. Participants were asked to choose the answer they were more
likely to give (see S1 Appendix), so there were no right or wrong choices. The at-issue part of
the answers (directly addressing the question) was either true (the Blue Center is better) or
false (the Red Center is better). In addition, the answers varied the not-at-issue content intro-
duced through an epistemic marker: whether the information was presented as originating in
the self or as originating in someone else and being indirect. Of primary interest was whether
the latter, indirect, epistemic markers would be selected more often when participants chose to
respond falsely to the question.




Participants were recruited from major universities and surrounding urban communities in
Canada, Italy, Estonia, and Turkey through posts on listserves and social media sites. Potential
participants were given a link to SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com) where they could
complete the study. To participate in the study, individuals had to identify themselves as native
and monolingual speakers of the target languages (for Canada, English). Information about
the final samples is provided in Table 1. The Canadian and Turkish participants received
course credit or had the opportunity to enter into a $25 draw as compensation.
Sample size
Sample size for the Canadian and Italian studies was arbitrarily set to a minimum of 80 and a
stop rule was the end of the term in which the studies were being conducted. The target sample
size range for the Turkish and Estonian studies, which followed a different design, was tenta-
tively set to 230–350 based on recommendations for logistic regression [35]. Additionally, the
sample sizes for these studies depended on the number of participants needed for the larger
batteries the studies were part of.
A final sample of 80 was achieved in the Canadian study. One participant was replaced due to
taking over a day to answer and three more for not answering all items. The final sample of the
Italian study consisted of 104 respondents, and there were no exclusions. The final sample size
for the Turkish study included 346 participants. Participants were not included in the analyses if
they accessed the survey twice (7) or failed to answer (21). The final sample size for the Estonian
study included 220 participants. Here, the data were collected in two rounds, as the first round
resulted in only 124 participants. Eleven participants were not included as they failed to answer.
Materials
English and Italian speakers were presented with four scenarios (see S1 Appendix for the
English version), and Estonian and Turkish speakers with just one (the Daycare scenario)
Preemptive reputation protection
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because the study was included in a longer testing session, during which participants com-
pleted a set of unrelated other tasks. All scenarios had similar structure. An actor, the Speaker,
gained first-hand information about a resource: quality of daycare centers, a foundation offer-
ing scholarships, a cheap used car dealership, or a weekend concert. Then a second actor, the
Addressee, with interests in the resource, requested information about it. Each scenario had
four versions based on the factorial manipulation of resource availability (ample vs. limited)
and the relationship between the actors (friends vs. acquaintances). For example, in the Day-
care scenario introduced above, the Speaker is looking for a daycare for her child and finds out
that the Blue Daycare Center is better than the Red Daycare Center. The (better) Blue Center
either had lots of openings or could accept only a few children. The Addressee, who has twins,
is also looking for daycare. To vary relationship, the Addressee was introduced either as a
“close friend” or just by name or as someone the Speaker had met once.
After the introduction of the Speaker, the Addressee, and the Addressee’s information
request, participants were asked to imagine being the Speaker and select an answer. The four
answers participants were asked to choose among were created by crossing the at-issue content
i.e., the part of the answer that addressed the information request, and two epistemic markers.
The at-issue content was either true or false. For example, in the Daycare scenario, two of the
answers stated that the Blue Center was better (true), and two that the Red Center is better
(false).
Table 2 shows the epistemic markers used in the four studies. The studies sampled episte-
mic information of different kinds and different grammatical status. Across studies, the episte-
mic markers conveyed either direct evidence and certainty (self column in Table 2) or indirect
evidence and uncertainty (indirect column in Table 2). In English and Italian, the epistemic
markers were lexical expressions, specifically descriptions of the experience that has led to
information acquisition (e.g., visiting daycares) or “I don’t know exactly but someone told
me.” In Estonian and Turkish, the studies drew on the grammaticalized evidential systems of
these languages. Estonian has an optional indirect evidential–vat that indicates that the infor-
mation is hearsay and, as in many other languages, directly attested information is unmarked
[36]. In Turkish, there are two evidential markers: -Di for first-hand evidence and -mIş for
indirect (second-hand or inferential) evidence. They are mandatory for past tense statements.
The present research used statements in the present tense, however, in which the direct eviden-
tial is not realized [37]. Thus, as in Estonian, the directly attested information in Turkish was
unmarked. The general pragmatic inference for evidentially unmarked sentences is that the
information is directly acquired by the speaker [38].
Table 1. Characteristics of the samples in the four studies.
English Italian Turkish Estonian
Years of data collection 2013–2014 2014 2013 2013,
2015–2016
N 80 104 346 220
Mean age (range) 24.9 (18–59) 34.4 (19–67) 22.3 a 37.3b (18–77)
% female (number reporting gender) 73% (79) 68% (101) 65% (345) 74% (213)
Note
a based on the 63% of participants who reported exact age
b participants either responded with year of birth or a range; in the latter case, the midpoint of the range was used to calculate the average
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200883.t001
Preemptive reputation protection
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200883 April 24, 2019 5 / 15
Design and procedure
For the English and Italian studies, the four versions of each scenario were distributed across
four lists. Each list contained each scenario and represented the four conditions resulting from
the crossing of the factors of resource availability and relationship between the speaker and the
addressee. Approximately an equal number of English and Italian speakers were presented
with each list. For the Estonian and Turkish studies, participants were presented with one of
the four versions of the Daycare scenario. About an equal number of participants responded to
each version.
All participants completed the study online on SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com)
after providing informed consent. The consent form informed the participants that they have
to answer a question after reading a short vignette /vignettes. For English and Italian partici-
pants, the four scenarios were presented in a fixed order (see S1 Appendix). The four answers
available to participants to choose among were also presented in a fixed order: true at-issue
content/self epistemic marker, false at-issue content/self epistemic marker, false at-issue con-
tent/indirect epistemic marker, true at-issue content/indirect epistemic marker. The text of
each scenario stayed on the screen until participants provided a response to avoid memory
issues.
Results
We begin by reporting the distribution of the answers selected by participants in each study.
After that, we focus on the correlates of participants’ choice of epistemic markers.
Answer distribution
Fig 1 shows the distribution of responses in each condition of the four studies. Condition here
is defined by whether communication was about limited or unlimited resources and whether
information was transmitted to an acquaintance or a friend. As Fig 1 shows, in all conditions
and across languages, participants selected answers that present truthful at-issue content and
indicate that the Speaker has direct evidence above chance. On average, the at-issue content




English I visited both daycares [and the Blue Center is
definitely better.] You should try to register your
kids there.
I do not know exactly, but someone told me that
[the Blue Center is definitely better.] You should
try to register your kids there.
Italian Ho visitato tutti e due i centri [ed il Centro Blu è
decisamente migliore.] Dovresti provare ad
iscrivere i gemelli lı`.
Non saprei esattamente, ma qualcuno mi ha detto
che [il Centro Rosso è migliore.] Dovresti provare
ad iscrivere i gemelli lı`
Grammatical epistemic markers
Estonian [Sinine Lasteaed] on [parem].1 [Sinine Lasteaed] olevat [parem].
Turkish [Mavi Yuva daha] iyi.1 [Mavi Yuva daha] iyiymiş.
Note. Epistemic markers are italicized. The at-issue content of the responses, here addressing the request for daycare
center information, is shown in square bracket [. . .]. The at-issue content could be either true or false.
1In Estonian and Turkish unmarked present indicative sentences were used to convey direct acquisition of the
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was truthfully reported by English speakers 89% of the time (t(79) = 19.717, p< . 001;
median = 1, Wilcoxon signed rank test Z = 7.783, p< . 001), by Italian speakers 93% of the
time (t(103) = 30.515, p< . 001; median = 1, Wilcoxon signed rank test Z = 9.302, p< . 001),
by Estonian speakers 90% of the time (χ2 (1, N = 220) = 136.04, p< . 001), and by Turkish
speakers 90% of the time (χ2 (1, N = 346) = 221.76, p< . 001). On average, the self epistemic
marker was chosen by English speakers 79% of the time (t(79) = 11.07, p< .001; median = .75,
Wilcoxon signed rank test Z = 6.736, p< . 001), by Italian speakers 80% of the time (t(103) =
13.965, p< . 001; median = .75, Wilcoxon signed rank test Z = 7.915, p< . 001), by Estonian
speakers 59% of the time (χ2 (1, N = 124) = 6.92, p = .009), and by Turkish speakers 73% of the
time (χ2 (1, N = 346) = 73.06, p< . 001).
The analyses of the determinants of the truthfulness of the at-issue content are available in
the supplementary materials (see S1 Table). The sensitivity of deception rates to the manipula-
tion of Resource Availability and Relationship between the Speaker and the Addressee varied
across studies (see supplemental materials, S1 Table). However, for the analyses of epistemic
marker choice, it is important that deception rates were similar across languages.
Fig 1. Distribution of the four answers in each condition in each of the four studies. Condition was varied within subject for Canadian and
Italian speakers and between subject in Estonian and Turkish speakers.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200883.g001
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Analytical approach
Of key interest in the present research was whether speakers varied epistemic markers as a
function of the truthfulness of the at-issue content. As we had repeated binary measures data
in English and Italian, the choice of an epistemic marker was modeled using generalized esti-
mating equations (GEE) which can be seen as an extension of logistic regression [39,40]. The
use of an indirect epistemic marker was modeled using a binomial distribution with a logit
link-function. The repeated data in English and Italian were modeled using several correlation
structures. Based on information criteria and computational convergence, an independent
correlation matrix was selected for the models reported here.
In addition to the truthfulness of the at-issue content, the GEE models included resource
availability, relationship with the addressee, and the interactions among the three factors. Even
though epistemic markers generally contribute not-at-issue content, as pointed out in the
Introduction, in some circumstances they can have at-issue status. Their manipulation thus
can be seen as lying. If so, speakers’ decisions about marker use may be affected by resource
availability and their relationship with the addressee [18]. Although we did not have specific
predictions, we reasoned that an effect of these variables is more likely when epistemic markers
are lexical than grammatical (i.e., in the English and Italian studies) as lexicalization is corre-
lated to having an at-issue status [29].
Details of the model selection process are presented in S2 Table. The three-way interaction
between truthfulness, resource availability, and relationship did not lead to improvement of
the models and did not have theoretical interest, so it was not included. Initial analyses showed
that scenario did not enter in any interactions in the data from English and Italian speakers,
thus it was included as a simple effect. Preliminary analyses also explored the effect of gender.
As none was found, this variable was not considered further either.
Epistemic marker choice
Table 3 summarizes the results from the four studies. All four studies showed that participants,
when asked to adopt the role of speakers who have valuable information, chose an epistemic
marker in a tight relation with whether they decided to answer the Addressee’s question










Truthfulness 38.736��� 18.013��� 4.198� 7.591��
Resource Availability .099 4.872� 1.765 .847
Relationship 1.196 .531 .587 1.328
Truthfulness X Resource Availability 6.176� 0 .279 .002
Truthfulness x Relationship .539 9.757�� 1.899 N/Ab
Resource Availability X Relationship 1.500 .968 .386 .334
Scenario 11.411�� 20.391��� N/A a N/A a




a Only one scenario was used in Estonia and Turkey, so the term was omitted.
b Term was omitted because of separation in the data: Estonian speakers always used an indirect evidential when lying to a friend.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0200883.t003
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truthfully or lie. In all studies, the at-issue content was more likely to be presented as indirect
when it was false. For English, Italian, Turkish, and Estonian, the odds of presenting informa-
tion as indirect were 21.4 (95% CI: 8.1–56.3), 7.8 (95% CI: 3.5–17.3), 3.1 (95% CI: 1.5–6.4), and
8.43 (95% CI: 2.76–25.75) times larger respectively if the information was falsified than if it
was true. (Odds ratios are reported from the models including truthfulness only because
parameter estimates from the complete models including interactions are relative to the other
terms.)
While the effect of truthfulness of the at-issue content was robust in all four studies, the
effects of resource availability and relationship between the Speaker and Addressee varied. For
English participants, resource availability modulated the effect of truthfulness. Even though
the effect of truthfulness was evident both when resources were ample and limited, the effect,
as indicated by the odds ratio, was stronger in situations with ample resources (OR 8.6 vs.
148). In other words, if English participants lied when the resources were ample, they were
even more likely to present the information with an indirect epistemic marker than if they lied
when the resources were limited.
Italian participants, on the other hand, were more likely to present the at-issue information
as originating in them (i.e., choose a self epistemic marker) when resources were ample,
regardless of the truthfulness of the response. Of greater interest, in this study relationship
modulated the effect of truthfulness on choice of epistemic marker. Even though the effect of
truthfulness was evident both when Italian participants shared information with a friend and
an acquaintance, the effect was stronger when talking with a friend. The odds of selecting an
indirect epistemic marker when lying to a friend were 27.9 compared to 3.3 when lying to an
acquaintance.
As indicated in Table 3, in the Estonian study, the interaction effect of relationship and
truthfulness of the at-issue content on the choice of epistemic marker could not be numerically
estimated. Estonian participants always chose an indirect epistemic marker when lying to a
friend. This suggests that relationship also has considerable influence on Estonian participants’
choice of epistemic markers when they lie. The Turkish study was the only one where neither
resource availability nor relationship with the addressee constrained the participants’ choice of
epistemic marker.
In the English and Italian studies, we also observed an effect of Scenario. In both studies,
the Scholarship scenario elicited the greatest use of indirect epistemic marker (about 35%), fol-
lowed by the Daycare scenario (used also in the Estonian and Turkish studies, about 20%), and
then the Car and Concert scenarios, which were about the same (15–11%). While the effect of
Scenario suggests that the situation can affect the likelihood of an indirect epistemic marker
use, as noted in the Analytical Approach section, Scenario did not modulate the effects of any
of the other variables. This gives us confidence that, even though only the Daycare scenario
was used in the Estonian and Turkish studies, the results from these studies generalize to other
situations.
Discussion
The present research provides experimental evidence for a novel kind of link between the way
information is reported and the human reputation management system. In particular, fore-
casting of the effects of behavior on reputation appears to involve not only context-sensitive
choices such as being more cooperative when re-encounters are likely [18,34,41], but also the
preemption of reputational repercussions when choosing not to cooperate. In four studies
involving four different languages, we found that when participants opted for a lie–a
Preemptive reputation protection
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paradigmatic uncooperative behavior–they presented it with an epistemic marker, thus
actively engaging in preemptive reputation protection.
In the tradition of self-presentation and impression management research human actions
such as information sharing and deception reflect a foresight into the reputational conse-
quences of behavior [8–11]. Reputation is a powerful motivation for a whole range of actions
(for a multi-disciplinary overview, see [42]), and an effective reputation management system
requires different competences. Here, we suggest that language, more specifically the selection
of epistemic markers might be part of the repertoire of reputation management. The present
research demonstrates that, as speakers, humans provide information that may frame their
actions for the addressees, thus constraining addressees’ inferences and the possible reputa-
tional consequences of the actions. In other words, speakers do not only modify their own
behavior as a result of reputational pressures but attempt to manipulate the reputational judg-
ment that their (sometimes self-serving) behavior may elicit. Presenting information as uncer-
tain and/or indirectly acquired distances individuals from the information, which reduces
their responsibility and mitigates the reputational consequences of deception.
Reputation management involves a cognitive mechanism that allows individuals to forecast
how their reputations will be affected by their actions and act accordingly [41]. This mecha-
nism is engaged when people consider the gains and risks of lying [10,43]. We propose that it
also incorporates the computation of preemptive action when the path of uncooperative
behavior is chosen. Such a system is consistent with proposals that human psychology has
evolved regulatory mechanisms that track and respond to one’s social valuation [17]. For
example, emotions such as shame, guilt, and anger can be seen as neurocomputational
responses to threats of perceived social devaluation [44]. The cognitive reputation manage-
ment mechanism is expressed in many ways in linguistic behavior. Speech acts like apologies
are reactions to discovered transgressions aiming to restore one’s reputation [45,46]. Seem-
ingly puzzling acts like spontaneous confessions are mostly observed when they will not
threaten one’s reputation or when the likelihood of discovering the speaker’s transgression is
high [47]. Language also provides means of changing the payoffs in information exchanges,
e.g., through indirectness (40). Finally, as we show, humans use linguistic devices to preemp-
tively protect their reputation when behaving uncooperatively.
While the planning and execution of a preemptive linguistic action may be rooted in an
evolved reputation management system, this action relies on acquired linguistic and pragmatic
knowledge, including the acquisition of evidentials and social norms. Thus, deploying a pre-
emptive action may be effortful and constrained by cognitive resources. The advantage of
being preemptive is greater control over one’s reputation. If an addressee discovers that the
speaker has been deceptive, the spread of this potentially reputation damaging information is
difficult to control [48]: speakers may not be at the right place at the right time to defend them-
selves, and they may not reach everyone who has been reached by the information. A preemp-
tive action, such as adding an indirect epistemic marker to the at-issue information, may
shield a speaker as it provides a context in which the addressee can interpret the false informa-
tion, and the speaker may avoid being blamed altogether. Thus, being preemptive may be well
worth any cognitive effort it implies.
Information sharing often appears altruistic as it involves effort and no obvious benefits,
e.g., when we help out a tourist or review a product online. Perhaps as a consequence, it has
been predominantly examined experimentally in conditions where the speaker’s self-interest
leads to no immediate benefits and minimal costs [49,50]. This, however, should not obscure
the fact that information sharing has costs. Many societies have evolved to collectively assume
some of these costs, as in the case of publicly funded education. When information sharing is
costly for individuals, they can be expected to deceive or conceal information while taking
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steps to protect their reputation. The present study provides a demonstration of such Machia-
vellianism. It can be also observed in gossip—the sharing of evaluative information about an
absent third party [51]. When gossiping, hedging the statements with epistemic qualifications
such as “someone told me” or “rumor has it” helps spread false or uncertain information with-
out the risk of being punished by both actors, the addressee and the gossip target [52]. Not sur-
prisingly, indirect evidentials are prominent in gossip situations [53,54].
Both certainty and source markers are sometimes discussed as bearing on the reliability of
information [55]. The speaker’s presentation of at-issue information as indirectly acquired
might make the information appear less reliable, thereby discouraging the addressee from
using it. However, the experimental evidence supporting the reliability interpretation of episte-
mic tools comes from examining receivers’ attitudes [56–58]. The present data cannot be
explained by assuming that participants manipulated epistemic status in order to manipulate
the reliability of information. If this were the case, in conditions of competition, participants
should be more likely to present true than false information as indirect, thus discouraging the
use of the former but not of the latter. None of the four studies, however, showed this pattern
(see Fig 1).
A major limitation of this present research is that participants were asked to answer ques-
tions about hypothetical situations. They were not involved in actual conversation, and there-
fore it is not possible to assess the extent to which selecting among predefined answers
corresponds to active, online decisions about lying or telling the truth. Furthermore, in con-
versation, individuals can answer in a large number of ways including laughing, changing
topic, or saying “I don’t know”. The participants in our study did not have this range of
options. However, the answers they chose among were all relevant [59,60]. The use of hypo-
thetical situations and predefined answers were necessary for the present research, for which it
was crucial to distinguish between true and false content. Further research is needed to exam-
ine whether the findings generalize to more naturalistic settings.
Although across all languages participants distanced themselves from false information by
presenting it as indirect, the results of the studies differed both in terms of the magnitude of
the effect of truthfulness and in terms of how truthfulness interacted with the other variables.
For example, we found that English participants were more likely to use an indirect epistemic
marker when presenting false information about an ample resource than about a limited
resource. And Italian and Estonian participants were more likely to use an indirect epistemic
marker when presenting false information to a friend than to an acquaintance. Of course,
lying to a friend has worse consequences for one’s reputation than lying to an acquaintance,
which may lead to greater tendency to preemptively protect oneself. Similarly, lying when
resources are ample is hard to explain, which may raise the stakes for reputation and lead
speakers to introducing distance between themselves and their lie. However, this reasoning
clearly did not generalize across all languages.
Identifying the reasons for the differences among the studies goes beyond the scope of the
present research. To some extent they may be due to the methodological differences among
the studies and the different realization of epistemic markers. For example, the Estonian and
Turkish samples were exposed only to the Daycare scenario. As a reminder, Scenario did not
interact with the other variables in the analyses of the English and Italian data, but the gener-
alizability of our findings will be boosted by examining a wider range of situations in all lan-
guages. In addition, as noted, lexicalization may be correlated to information having at-issue
status [49], and the influence of resource availability and relationship between the speaker and
the addressee may be constrained to at-issue content. In line with this suggestion, Turkish was
the only language with a mandatory grammaticalized evidential system in this set of studies,
and here resource availability and relationship had no effect. However, given that the results of
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the English and Italian studies differed despite a close methodological match, the causes of the
differences in results, if replicated, would suggest factors other than methods and semantics of
the epistemic markers. Further research should be undertaken to understand the conditions
favoring preemptive reputation protection and to what extent they depend on cultural and lin-
guistic differences.
A potentially intriguing aspect of our results is the lack of gender differences. There is a
growing literature showing that men and women behave differently depending on the kind of
lying. Capraro [61] shows that males are more likely to use black lies, e.g., lies that benefit the
liar at a cost for another person, and altruistic white lies. In our research, as resource availabil-
ity and the relationship between the Speaker and the Addressee varied across conditions, mis-
information was not consistently a white or a black lie and our studies may have been under-
powered to detect an effect of gender. In addition, in some conditions, it is not straightforward
to classify misinformation as a white or a black lie, e.g., when resources are ample. While there
might be gender differences in lying, the evidence for gender differences in sensitivity to repu-
tational factors is still scarce and requires further investigation [62].
It is important to extend the findings to other languages with grammaticalized evidential
systems as well as to examine responses to different ways of lexicalizing epistemic markers in
languages without such systems. Future research is also needed to examine the development of
preemptive reputation protection. Children’s behavior shows sensitivity to reputational pres-
sures by age five [13,41]. However, using language as a tool to avoid the consequences of lying
may require further linguistic and cognitive maturation.
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